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Ethics, Faith, and Reason, by Richard Taylor. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice 
Hall, 1985. 125 pp. 
Reviewed by TERRY J. CHRISTLIEB, Syracuse University. 
In this book Richard Taylor argues that philosophers would make better use of 
their time if they ceased to worry about what is right and wrong and began 
instead to ponder what human happiness is and what an excellent person is. The 
basis of this appeal is an argument which runs roughly as follows. Ancient Greek 
moralists pursued an ethics of aspiration. They recognized the categories of 
"duty" and "right and wrong," but saw them as a matter of mere societal conven-
tion. Then a plague came upon Greek ethics: Christianity. Christianity had no 
ethics of aspiration. Instead it had an ethics of duty. Ethics, it taught, is no more 
and no less than a matter of obeying the commands of a Divine Law-giver. In 
addition, Christians did not pursue ethics through reasoning, and so they did not 
recognize the person with great reasoning powers as peculiarly excellent. In fact, 
Christians taught that all persons are completely equal, just in virtue of being 
God's creations, and so Christianity killed the drive for excellellce of any kind. 
Thus the rise in popularity of this religion led to the abandonment of the ethics 
of aspiration and its replacement by the ethics of duty. And the duty was no 
longer a duty to societal customs, but a duty to God. 
One final stage in the tragic demise of the Greek ethic remained to unfold. 
Modem philosophers rejected belief in the Divine Law-giver. In this they were 
clear sighted. But they held on to the notion of nonconventional, transcultural 
duty. In this they erred. Thus they came to believe in moral, as opposed to 
customary or legal, obligations. A survey of the modem history of ethics shows 
that these modems have only been talking nonsense. They have not been able 
to explain what the source of this alleged transcultural moral obligation is, even 
though they have spared no effort in trying to do so. The proper conclusion to 
draw is this: talk of moral obligation is nonsense, so we ought to abandon such 
discussions and return to a pursuit of the ethics of aspiration. 
That is Taylor's thesis, a thesis which seems to me highly implausible. In this 
review I can address only a few of the erroneous or unsupported claims that 
Taylor makes in the course of this book. I will divide my comments into three 
sections. 
I. TAYLOR ON RELIGION 
Taylor does not offer a definition of 'religion,' but "Christianity" and "religion" 
are all but equated for purposes of his discussion. He offers several interrelated 
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charges against religion, which when taken together are supposed to show how 
religion helped to destroy ethics. Consider two of these charges: 
I. Religion repudiates, and is incompatible with, reason (pp. 7,25,44,71,79). 
The problem with this charge is that it saddles religion with what is at best a 
minority report on this relationship. Reason, he asserts, is "diametrically opposed 
(p. 79)" to faith and "No two values would seem to offer less hope of reconciliation 
with each other than faith and reason .... (p. 45)." Without justification or 
argument Taylor utilizes the most extreme view of the faith/reason relationship. 
In fact, religion does not "repudiate" reason, and does not deny its usefulness 
in ethics nor its desirability as a human quality in general. It would be closer to 
the truth to say that what is usually denied is that reason is the only virtue. 
Moreover, the historical period of interest includes such Christian thinkers as 
Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, and Butler. Surely it is just 
false to suggest that these and many others like them repudiated reason. 
2. Religion teaches a mindless equality of all people based on nothing more 
than their creation in God's image (pp. 7, 25f, 66, 71, 79, 85f). 
This charge is even more obviously false than the first one. According to Taylor: 
while the Greeks had upheld the ideal of excellence and nobility, which 
elevated its possessor above the common run of humanity , the Christians 
came upon the scene to announce that this common run, including the 
lowliest, was itself possessed of an excellence bestowed by the divine 
creator and actually surpassing anything reason could ever aspire to. 
People were declared to be the veritable images of God, just by virtue 
of their minimal humanity. They had, therefore, no greater individual 
excellence to aspire to ... (p. 7f). 
Here Taylor misleads by oversimplification. While it is true that Christians 
see all humans as having a basic worth, they are nevertheless in many different 
conditions. There is much talk of maturity and immaturity, of growth, of effort, 
of striving, of disciplining oneself, etc. Even a casual acquaintance with Christian 
documents will confirm this. Consider an example chosen from the New Testa-
ment: 
... make every effort to add to your faith goodness; and to goodness, 
knowledge; and to knowledge, self-control; and to self-control, persever-
ance; and to perseverance, godliness; and to godliness, brotherly kind-
ness; and to brotherly kindness, love. For if you possess these qualities 
in increasing measure, they will keep you from being ineffective and 
unproductive in your knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ (II Peter 1 :5-8). 
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It is not the case that religion teaches that there is no form of excellence to be 
sought. The truth is that Taylor simply disagrees with religious thinkers about 
what true personal excellence is. The church has always held up an ideal of 
human life, the life of Christ. It is to such a life that the Christian is to aspire. 
Taylor completely ignores this prominent feature of Christian ethics. 
Finally, suppose that Christianity does affirm that there is a certain basic worth 
in even the "stupid and uncouth," to use Taylor's description of most humans. 
Suppose that it does affirm that there is a certain basic amount of respect and 
certain rights due to every human. Isn't that a point in favor of Christianity? 
Taylor's elitism, which calls for us to deny the worth of most of humanity, is 
a singularly unattractive ethics, especially in light of the political experiences of 
our own century. 
II. TAYLOR ON ETHICS 
Taylor distinguishes two approaches to ethics which he calls the ethics of 
'duty' (or 'obligation') and the ethics of 'aspiration' (or 'virtue'). This basic 
contrast between an interest in what one ought to be as opposed to what one 
ought to do is familiar enough, but as we shall see Taylor does not make good 
use of it. 
1. The Interdependence Issue 
Taylor's whole argument assumes that aspiration and duty cannot be on an 
equal footing in approaching ethics; that they are not interdependent. He does 
not really explore the relationship between duty and aspiration ethics, except to 
point out some differences between them. But are these differences irreconcilable 
or merely differences of emphasis? Perhaps virtue and duty are not mutually 
exclusive concerns. 
It is not as though nothing has ever been said about the relationship of virtue 
and duty. Even representatives of religion(!) can be found discussing it in the 
modem literature. To take a single example, Stanley Hauerwas argued for the 
interdependence of the two approaches as far back as 1975', a full decade before 
the appearance of Taylor's book. So it is more than a little surprising to find 
that Taylor says nothing about this issue, and it is inexcusable in light of the 
fact that his thesis presupposes that the two approaches are not interdependent 
in any significant way. Hauerwas, by the way, was arguing against the mistake 
of seeing duty ethics as the "real" ethics, at the expense of virtue ethics. Taylor 
offers the opposite extreme: virtue ethics as the only real ethics. 
326 Faith and Philosophy 
2. The Consensus Issue 
Taylor apparently assumes that discussions of virtue are likely to yield greater 
agreement than comparable discussions of duty. With reference to discussions 
of duty he says: 
Educated people do not need to be told, however, that questions such 
as these have never been answered outside of religion .... Why, then, 
if such questions are unanswerable, are they still treated as being so 
important (p. 2)? 
Taylor offers this as a reason for switching to discussion of aspiration topics. 
But why suppose that there is better prospect for a consensus of opinion on those 
matters? Note Alasdair MacIntyre's comment: 
One response to the history which I have narrated so far might weB be 
to suggest that even within the relatively coherent tradition of thought 
which I have sketched there are just too many different and incompatible 
conceptions of a virtue for there to be any real unity to the concept or 
indeed to the history. Homer, Sophocles, Aristotle, the New Testament 
and medieval thinkers differ from each other in too many ways . . . . If 
we were to consider later Western writers on the virtues, the list of 
differences and incompatibilities would be enlarged still further . . . .2 
That is enough, I think, to remind us that Taylor is making a bold assumption 
when he argues for abandonment of discussions of duty on grounds that we 
could achieve more consensus by talking about something else. 
Ill. TAYLOR ON THE RELIGION/ETHICS RELATIONSHIP 
When Taylor turns to discussion of the relationship between ethics and religion 
he introduces a new series of unwarranted claims. 
1. Religion caused a shift from the ancient ethics of aspiration to the ethics of 
duty (pp. 7f, 72f, 78t). 
This claim is simply unfounded. For a) perhaps such a shift did occur, but it 
may be that the concurrent rise of Christianity was not the cause of this shift, 
or perhaps it was not the major or sale cause, and b) Taylor does not even offer 
proofthat such a shift did take place at the same time as the rise of the church. 
2. Religion nourished the idea of a transcultural duty (7f, 72f, 7St). 
This, I believe, is a good example of the single cause faBacy. Religion certainly 
does nourish this idea, but there is no reason to think that only religion nourishes 
such an idea, and there is no evidence offered by Taylor to show that historically 
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only religion nourished this idea. 
3. Only a divine command theory can ground transcultural duty. 
A lot of philosophers would want to argue with this assertion. And if it were 
somehow shown conclusively that only a divine command can ground transcul-
tural duty, then it might happen that a lot of people, even among philosophers, 
would rather adopt a belief in God than, with Taylor, deny that there are duties 
that are deeper than societal custom. 
4. Religion cannot sustain an aspiration ethic. 
Taylor never asks whether Christianity is committed to having only a duty 
ethic. As a result he offers us a false dilemma: 
On the one side is the idea of virtue, which ancient pagan philosophy 
identified with personal excellence, that is, with what one is. On the 
other side was a different idea of virtue, identified by the Christians 
with obedience to God's laws, that is, with what one does (p. 51). 
I mentioned above that the New Testament has room for aspiration, but contem-
porary philosophers and theologians also recognize that Christianity is compatible 
with virtue ethics. 
In several recent articles Henry Veatch has powerfully upheld the pos-
ition ... that any true moral theory must, like Aristotle's, be 
eudaimonistic, and primarily concerned with virtue rather than with 
law. In doing so he has sided ... with the main body of Thomist 
philosophers. 3 
For Jesus ethics was fundamentally a matter of a person's character 
rather than of his activity. What he is, is more important than what he 
does, for his character will determine his action.4 
The first quotation concerns the views of Thomists. The latter is from a 
conservative Protestant. Both stress the aspiration end of the duty/aspiration 
dichotomy. Quotations of this sort could be piled up indefinitely. The wonder 
is that Taylor is not aware of how thoroughly virtue oriented the Christian ethic 
is. There seems to be widespread recognition that it is at least potentially more 
virtue oriented than duty oriented. So it is very puzzling to find Taylor assuming 
that it cannot sustain an ethics of aspiration. 
To summarize, the book offers a grandiose thesis built on a series of claims 
about religion, ethics, and historical development that are either false, misleading, 
or unsubstantiated. 
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Butler (The Arguments of the Philosophers Series), by Terrence Penelhum. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985. pp. x + 221. Cloth $39.95. 
Reviewed by DAVID E. WHITE, St. John Fisher College. 
This book is in two parts with the larger devoted to the rehabilitation of Butler's 
philosophy of religion, which Penelhum ranks second in English only to Hume's 
(p. vii). A rehabilitation is needed to resist what might be called the received 
view of Butler's philosophical theology: the Analogy is directed to the stance of 
the deists, but there are no deists now; hence, neglect of Butler's work is justified 
(p. 6). Penelhum rejects the second premise with two references, but is mainly 
concerned to argue against the validity of this argument, not just against its 
soundness. 
Philosophers often write as if their work had universal significance, only to 
have critics find their endeavors parochial. With Butler the reverse seems to 
have been the case. His stated aims are modest, but commentators have found 
in him the very archetype of a fully sufficient philosophy of religion. 
So Penelhum's central question is important both for intellectual history and 
for what is Penelhum's main interest, contemporary philosophy of religion. 
Penelhum's work is excellent; he puts just the right emphasis on just the right 
points and, at least with regard to the Analogy, much of his analysis is ground-
breaking. My complaints concern matters of detail on the one hand and omission 
on the other. The principal shortcoming is that just when things get really 
interesting, Penelhum calls an abrupt halt to the inquiry. 
Very early on (p. 4) Penelhum makes the key point, which he never tires of 
repeating: "although a theorist of the highest quality," Butler is "not interested 
in theory for itself'; rather his "purpose is always a practical one." It is commonly 
acknowledged that in matters of practice, when we are forced to decide, we 
must settle for a far lesser degree of evidence than would compel full intellectual 
assent. So, since religion is a practical matter, no more can be demanded of the 
"proof' of religion than would be demanded of a secular choice of comparable 
